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Abstract
In Africa, while most countries report some COVID-19 cases, the fraction of reported patients is low, with
about 20 000 cases compared to the more than 2.3 million cases reported globally as of April 18, 2020.
Few African countries have reported case numbers above one thousand, with South Africa reporting 3 034
cases being hit hardest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Several African countries, especially South Africa, have
already taken strong non-pharmaceutical interventions that include physical distancing, restricted economic,
educational and leisure activities and reduced human mobility options. The required strengths and overall
effectiveness of such interventions, however, are debated because of simultaneous but opposing interests in
most African countries: strongly limited health care capacities and testing capabilities largely conflict with
pressured national economies and socio-economic hardships on the individual level, limiting compliance to
intervention targets. Here we investigate implications of interventions on the COVID-19 outbreak dynamics,
focusing on South Africa before and after the national lockdown enacted on March 27, 2020. Our analysis
shows that initial exponential growth of existing case numbers is consistent with doubling times of about
2.5 days. After lockdown, the growth remains exponential, now with doubling times of 18 days, but still in
contrast to subexponential growth reported for Hubei/China after lockdown. Moreover, a scenario analysis
of a computational data-driven agent based mobility model for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (with
1.14 million inhabitants) hints that keeping current levels of intervention measures and compliance until the
end of April is of insufficient length and still too weak, too unspecific or too inconsistently complied with
to not overload local intensive care capacity. Yet, enduring, slightly stronger, more specific interventions
combined with sufficient compliance may constitute a viable option for interventions for regions in South
Africa and potentially for large parts of the African continent.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Evidence before this study. Several studies have analyzed the ongoing outbreak of the Corona
Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in China and several European countries. However, conditions
in African countries are vastly different and often fragile, with conflicting limitations of both the
health care system and socio-economic conditions, posing difficult challenges for decisions about
enacting and lifting interventions. These countries are currently in the early stages of the outbreak
and have been reporting a small but rapidly increasing number of patients diagnosed with COVID-
19. Several countries have taken different intervention measures to counter a large-scale COVID-
19 outbreak. In particular, in South Africa, with the largest number of cases in Sub-Saharan Africa,
case numbers are known to less rapidly increase after national lockdown on March 27, 2020.
Added value of this study. This study reports a quantitative analysis of the case number dynamics
reported by the World Health Organization and Johns Hopkins University until including April 18,
2020, both for Africa overall and South Africa specifically, before and after national lockdown.
It also reports and analyzes results of an agent-based mobility simulation for the Nelson Mandela
Bay Municipality, South Africa (1.14 million inhabitants). This case study relies on detailed large-
scale mobility survey data of about 10% of the population and on estimates of the fractions by
which interventions decrease specific activities. The simulational data on outbreak dynamics thus
provide qualitative order of magnitude estimates of trends consistent with past data. Combined,
both analyses may help to better understand the implications of interventions on and estimate the
dynamics of the number of (critically) infected patients.
Implications of all the available evidence. The results suggest that current interventions are not
yet sufficient to contain a larger-scale outbreak. Interventions slightly stronger than those imple-
mented today or a higher degree of compliance to the enacted lockdown, in combination with
longer-lasting measures than currently announced for South Africa may help bound the case num-
bers such that the number of critical patients remains at or below (and does not massively overbur-
den) the local capacity of intensive care units. Strategies for strengthening or lifting interventions
should be advised by advanced data analytics and predictive modeling estimates, for instance for
evaluating necessary time intervals and required levels of interventions. Overall, the study points
to a potentially viable chance for effective non-pharmaceutical countermeasures against COVID-
19 epidemics in South Africa, with suggestions for Health Policy for large parts of the African
continent and, generally, disadvantaged countries and regions.
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INTRODUCTION
The severe acute respiratory syndrom coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has reached more than 200
countries and territories across all continents1,2. By death toll, the resulting Corona Virus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) outbreak will likely soon become the largest pandemic of the 21st century so
far3. There is currently no specific medical intervention known against SARS-CoV-2 and pre-
ventive vaccination options are not yet available. The resulting vast number, broad geographical
distribution, and intensity of globally enacted socio-economic interventions is unprecedented in
modern human history.
Mainland China was the first region hit by the outbreak in January 2020 and had taken rapid
and severe interventions including an almost complete lockdown for eleven weeks. It thereby
succeeded to suppress the outbreak dynamics to subexponential growth patterns4 and in April
2020 is reporting a total of 83 500 cases and at most 130 new cases daily for now more than four
weeks.2 As of April 18th, several countries in Europe are reporting more than 100 000 cases each
and the United States alone reports above 700 000 cases. At the same time, Africa as a continent
with a population of 1.3 billion people as of 2018 5 has reported only about 21 000 cases and
about 1 000 (approximately 4.8%) deaths.2,6,7 Of those, the largest number of COVID-19 patients
is reported in South Africa with 3 034 cases and 52 (about 1.7%) deaths as of April 18, 2020.2,8
Across all these countries, the total number of cases is rapidly increasing.
Across the African continent, national economic constraints, individual poverty, low health lit-
eracy rates, weaker health care systems and cultural practices lead to reduced option spaces on
personal and governmental levels and may all contribute to more severe consequences of the
COVID-19 outbreak and negatively influence containment as well as recording, testing and med-
ical treatment9. Similar conditions will hold for most countries of the Global South, calling for
particular attention on African countries10.
In general, health care systems in African countries feature only a small number of available in-
tensive care units (ICUs) compared to most countries of the Global North.11,12 At the same time,
African countries are under particular pressure due to economic constraints on both national and
personal levels. Besides strong repercussions on national economic productivity expected for any
large-scale lockdown, a large fraction of the population is unable to fully comply with severe
lockdown measures due to their personal financial situation. An African task force for coronavirus
preparedness and response (AFTCOR) has been established to manage these combined and con-
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flicting constraints both for the current COVID-19 outbreak and for future preparedness13. Their
work focuses on enabling medical diagnosis and screening options, clinical treatment of COVID-
19 patients, infection prevention and control in health care facilities, supply chain management,
and the communication of risks to experts and the public. Qualitative and quantitative data analyt-
ics and estimates of the outbreak dynamics and evaluating containment options essentially underlie
but are not in the focus of their work.
South Africa offers a comparatively high capacity of intensive care units (ICUs) to respond to
outbreaks, with estimates ranging from maximally 7 195 ICU beds theoretically in existence to
2 926 practically available nationwide across both public and private sectors14. The order of mag-
nitude of these numbers is consistent with earlier reports.15 However, the factually available ICU
beds have likely declined during the past decade necessitating rationing and triage (prioritisation)
decisions that have been frequently necessary in South Africa even in times before COVID-19,
particularly in the publicly funded health sector.14,16 Moreover ICU capacity in the private sector
is not readily and generally accessible.
INFLUENCE OF LOCKDOWN ON PAST CASE NUMBERS
On March 5, 2020, the first COVID-19 patient has been confirmed in South Africa and after
starting with specific smaller measures from March 15 onwards, the South African government
enacted a national lockdown effective March 27, 2020. This lockdown includes measures such
as the complete closure of childcare, institutions of primary and higher education as well as all
public leisure activities, severe physical distancing rules, an estimated 70% reduction of shopping,
85% of on-site work force and a 90% reduction in other activities. An initial formal reduction of
shared publicly available mobility services by about 75% was, after protests, revised to about
30% reduction17 (estimates by GoMetro, South Africa). These shared mobility services provide
a large fraction of transportation and constitute one of the special conditions in South Africa and
many other African countries.18 For instance in South Africa, instead of formal public transit,
transportation is dominated by private, semi-regulated minibus taxis with typically 15 seats.18
Due to their mass usage, usually high occupancy and the close contact between passengers in the
vehicles, these mobility services may contribute substantially to the spread of COVID-19.
Fitting the number of total reported cases in South Africa before and after the national lockdown
(Figure 1) indicates that the lockdown drastically reduces the relative increase in case numbers,
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as quantified by the growth exponent, decreasing from r = 0.32 per day in the beginning of the
outbreak to about r = 0.27 per day just before the lockdown and down to r = 0.038 per day after
the lockdown, reflecting an increase of the doubling time from about 2.5 to about 18 days (Fig. 1,
panels A and B). The immediate switch to slower growth at the date of the official lockdown may
be originating from several factors that remain unknown. For instance, the number of patients
tested per day has substantially increased initially8,19 and tests may have been delayed at the very
onset. In any given region, the first person infected is likely detected only after exhibiting symp-
toms while later cases may be identified by preemptive contact tracing and thereby identified as
they appear, ideally before showing symptoms. Other contributing factors may include stochas-
tic small number fluctuations occurring at the onset of any epidemic outbreak, already existing
awareness of the COVID-19 outbreak and many individuals taking partial countermeasures before
the official national lockdown.
As the number of cases in South Africa makes up a substantial share of all reported cases through-
out Africa, the effect also becomes visible in the data for the entire continent (Fig. 1A,B). For
Africa as a whole, growth exponents dropped from about r = 0.22 to r = 0.086. The data for
Africa suggest a further decrease of the exponent, ongoing after the South African lockdown. This
downtrending may be associated with measures taken up at different points in time in the most
strongly affected countries of Northern Africa, and the vastly heterogeneous case numbers, test
coverage and reporting of cases across African countries, all entangling with the reduced number,
but still large share of South African COVID-19 patients.
While the growth exponents have been substantially reduced, between a factor of 7.1 (South
Africa) and a factor of 2.6 (all of Africa), the growth remains exponential, even three weeks into
the lockdown. This is in stark contrast to the outbreak dynamics in Mainland China, where the
strict containment measures of the Hubei region has led to subexponential growth20 followed by
a massive decrease of new case numbers within weeks after lockdown2. The unbroken exponen-
tial growth trend in South Africa is also indicated by the number of newly infected people per
week steeply increasing when displayed as a function of the total number of infected (Figure 1C),
instead of curving down.
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MODELING FUTURE SCENARIOS
The current national lockdown has been extended from an original three weeks (until April 17,
2020) with relaxations now suggested for the beginning of May, 2020. We thus ran scenario simu-
lations to estimate future case numbers and probe responses to different intervention strengths and
durations. We employed a computational data-driven, agent based transport model for the Nelson
Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM, Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1.14 million inhabitants)21 with
lockdown fractions of work, leisure, and shopping activities and complete lockdown of childcare
and educational institutions, in line with measures currently implemented in South Africa. To
reflect potential non-compliance with enacted lockdown measures, the simulations took only a
85% reduction of other activities; for minibus taxi services we took a 50% effective reduction of
passengers, to reflect the tradeoff between non-compliance and the reduction in demand due to
less people required or wishing to travel caused by the other lockdown measures and the outbreak
(estimates by GoMetro, South Africa).
Our simulations are consistent with the growth exponents of the total number of infected individ-
uals both before and after national lockdown, indicating growth factors of about r = 0.32 ± 0.01
and about r = 0.04 ± 0.02, respectively (Figure 2A,B). The exponents cannot be specified more
exactly due to the unpredictable stochastic factors in the transmission process creating substantial
variations in particular at low case numbers, sampled over in simulations with ten random real-
izations each. Importantly, there are simulated case dynamics that display an early (within April,
2020) saturation of the total number of cases at 10 000 or below. However, the ensemble of sim-
ulations of the lockdown scenario suggests an ongoing outbreak either entirely without saturation
or with early but non-persistent saturation and renewed increase in May. Figure 2C displays the
same data of the dynamics in a state space characterizing the epidemics without referring to ab-
solute time (as in Fig. 1C), thereby enabling to compare system-wide potential pathways. The
results illustrate that current lockdown measures substantially slow the spread of the outbreak in
all realizations, but only 1 out of 10 realizations manages to completely stop the outbreak while
hundreds of thousands of people become infected in the other realizations in the Nelson Mandela
Bay Municipality alone.
To evaluate the expected outbreak dynamics and the maximal number of critical patients requiring
intensive care, we studied four different scenarios by agent-based simulations, again ten realiza-
tions per scenario (Figure 3). Entirely lifting the currently enacted lockdown on May 1 would
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cause an immediate rise of infected patient numbers and a delayed rapid rise of critical patient
numbers drastically beyond the ICU capacity available in NMBM (estimated to be 50 based on
downscaling (proportional, by population size) the 267 ICU beds expected to be available in the
entire Eastern Cape Province22). Whereas the exact numbers will depend on details of the sim-
ulation, further simulations (not shown) indicate a manifold overload of ICU capacity also after
varying mobility parameters. Lifting lockdown by 25% two weeks later, i.e. on May 15, still
would cause massive rise in case numbers and ICU overload in early June. Maintaining current
lockdown conditions strongly slows the outbreak, yet our simulations suggest that such interven-
tions together with current compliance are marginally insufficient to contain the epidemic long
term and keep the number of critical patients below ICU capacity (Fig. 3B and C), as suggested
already by our data analysis of past case numbers (Figure 1). Finally a fourth scenario of slightly
strengthening current interventions, either by slightly stricter, possibly even more specific lock-
down regulations, by increasing compliance, or a combination both (90% reduction of shopping
and other, 95% reduction of work activities and complete restriction of all other activities includ-
ing public mobility in the simulations), may keep the number of critical COVID-19 patients at or
below the ICU capacity and may largely contain the epidemic by end of June 2020.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of reported past case data is robust and suggests that the outbreak currently still grows
too quickly to contain the number of critical COVID-19 patients significantly below available ICU
capacities nation-wide. The main potential causes of errors in the analysis of past data may be
biased or undersampled testing and reporting of case numbers.
Predicting future case numbers and the number of critical patients under different scenario condi-
tions is much more difficult. The most difficult challenge is the bridging of scales between known
or estimated country-wide overall conditions and specific urban level scenarios (at 1.14 million
people) that are again subsampled at about 10% of the population, not primarily due to simula-
tional constraints but due to the availability of socio-economic and travel data for about 100 000
people only.21 Combined with the COVID-19 outbreak being at an early stage, the number of
infected patients is of an order of magnitude between 101 and 103 in NMBM, thereby causing
strong stochastic number fluctuations that make individual predictions unreliable. We attempted
to compensate for such fluctuations partially by running ensemble simulations for 10 random re-
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alizations, with a random subsample of initial patients infected (and thus varying their location,
household size, employment status etc.). As the results are based on limited ensemble simulations,
they likely underestimate the probability of extreme outcomes such as strong increase or random
decay of the outbreak.
CONCLUSION
The results reported above suggest that current lockdown levels may be just marginally insufficient
to prevent a massive COVID-19 outbreak in South Africa. As the increase in case numbers is still
exponential and not subexponential as reported for Mainland China20, South Africa may be still
in the unfortunate situation to become for the African continent what Italy has been for Europe23,
with potentially devastating consequences.
A rapid large-scale infection within weeks to a few months, the likely outcome if the national
lockdown was lifted or relaxed early May8, implies a manifold overload of ICU capacity. Inter-
ventions slightly stronger than those implemented today, or even a higher degree of compliance
to the enacted lockdown alone may constitute a viable chance for effective countermeasures for
regions in South Africa and potentially for large parts of the African continent.
However, a number of boundary conditions beyond those known for past major hubs of the
COVID-19 pandemic in countries like Mainland China, the United States or Italy23 need to be
taken into account simultaneously. Most African countries find themselves under much stronger
socio-economic and health care system constraints than countries of the Global North.
For instance, a large fraction of the work force both is at lower-income levels and simultaneously
has no fall-back option to remote work. As many of such work activities are not tagged ”essential”
in the sense of the lockdown, people often have zero income or immediately fall into extreme
poverty. Moreover, even where remote work is possible, it comes with additional challenges24.
Still, South Africa is potentially in a better position than many other African countries, so the
conclusions (for South Africa specifically) might be conservative in this sense.
The South African health situation includes a high risk of COVID-19 coinfections for patients
with, e.g., HIV/AIDS or forms of tuberculosis (TBC) and implies additional challenges. Accord-
ing to the WHO 2019, South Africa ranks 4th globally in the number of TBC infections per capita
and 3rd for those coinfected with TBC and HIV. Moreover, the South African population infected
with TBC alone is about 320 000 (0.5%, about 20 times higher rate than in Europe) and a total of
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7.7 million people (13%) are infected with HIV as of 2018.25,26
Therefore, regulatory decision against COVID-19 cannot only keep in mind short-term economic
constraints.17 A large-scale outbreak and massive ICU overload may have drastic consequences
for the country as a whole, including societal and economic but also psychological, and ethical
issues (compare27). Thinking of economic constraints should also imply thinking of long-term
implications, for both economy and society. This perspective underlines again the coaction advo-
cated by the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular Good Health
and Wellbeing (SDG 3), Sustainable Cities and Transportation (SDG 11), and Reduced Inequality
both within and among countries (SGD 10) in the context of COVID-19.
An integrated perspective on such goals may help paving the way to a fair and sustained solution
of the COVID-19 crisis and future pandemics across African countries as well as for individuals,
groups and regions in a position much more fragile than common for countries of the Global North,
as also underlined by the proposed CoHERE programme.28
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Fig. 1. COVID-19 in Africa and South Africa. (A) and (B) The number of confirmed COVID-19
patients in Africa (gray squares) and specifically South Africa (black disks) from March 1, 2020
until April 16, 2020, on (A) linear and (B) logarithmic scales. Best exponential fits (colored lines)
yield growth rates r where the total number of (reported) infected patients N ∝ exp(r t) where
t measures time in days. (C) State space representing the number of newly reported patients as
a function of the total of reported people infected (including the recovered), eliminating absolute
time. Straight solid line of slope 1 indicates pure exponential growth The impact of the lockdown
executed on March 27 is clearly visible (vertical lines in panels A and B).
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Fig. 2. Estimated COVID-19 cases for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, South Africa.
(A, B) Simulation of the outbreak without interventions (red fit) and with current interventions (or-
ange fit) on (A) linear and (B) logarithmic scales. Thin grey lines represent individual simulations,
the solid black lines represent their averages. Growth rates are consistent with the observations for
South Africa in the beginning of the outbreak (without lockdown) and after the lockdown (com-
pare Figure 1). (C) State space representing the number of newly reported patients as a function of
the total of reported people infected (including the recovered), eliminating absolute time. While
the lockdown measures slow the spread of the outbreak, the growth remains exponential for some
time (compare also Figure 1C).
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maintain current lockdown until June 30 (yellow), and enforcing lockdown or increasing compli-
ance from May 1, 2020 (green). (B) Number of critical patients and estimated capacity available
in NMBM (horizontal dotted line). Data encoding as in (A). The dashed vertical line illustrates
the available ICU capacity. (C) Maximum number of patients requiring intensive care during the
outbreak until end of June 2020, across scenarios (color code as before). Bars indicate averages
across realizations and standard deviation, small disks individual realizations. Note that these
numbers may increase after June 2020, for example when maintaining the lockdown (compare
upwards trend in panel B). All data based on ten realizations of agent-based simulations for each
of four scenarios for NMBM, South Africa.
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